April, '93'

THE DISTURBED TENANT-A PHASE OF
CONSTRUCTIVE EVICTION
WILLIAMI H.

LLOYD

"Yes," said the host as he showed his guest over the apartment, "it is comfortable and we have a fine view but I am afraid
we will have to go. The people next door are terrible and the
management will do nothing. You are a lawyer," he added,
brightening at the prospect of some free advice, "what would
you do ?" The suggestion that he first examine his lease which,
providentially, was not on the premises, postponed indefinitely
an impromptu opinion wrung from an embarrassed guest who
was not wrong in suspecting, as he said when he came to discuss
the question with the writer, that an examination of the cases
would show the factors necessary to be taken into consideration
were more numerous than would seem probable to a casuai
inquirer.
One in search of evidence expressly designed to support the
so-called economic interpretation of history will find in the common law pertaining to landlord and tenant abundant material in
confirmation of this depressing view. All the cards, as the
phrase is, are stacked against the tenant. Even the common forms
of lease sold by the law stationers are little more than traps for
the unwary, ingeniously drafted in the landlord's interest. Indeed, the data proves far too much; for if class-conscious self
interest is at the root of all legal doctrines, then surely by this
day the preponderating influence of the immense group of tenants
for years, or less, now long in possession of the franchise and
substantial political power would have made itself felt more
effectively than has been the case up to the present time. Other
strong factors are certainly present, for one thing, a traditional
attitude toward land hardened by years of tacit acceptance. Most
persons in an old established community have common habits of
mind, customary methods of approach to their more intimate legal
relations, an obscure inheritance from their ancestors which native
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conservatism tempers by occasional concessions rather than downright reform.
It would be difficult to deny to the Roman landlord, social
and political power equal to that of members of the same class
in England or America. Yet Roman law was more favorable
to the tenant than the common law. The Roman law of letting
and hiring (locatio conductio), which applied equally to things
movable and immovable, rested on the principle that it was the
beneficial use and enjoyment which was conferred by the contract. Risk of accidental loss was on the lessor, not in the sense
that he had still to provide the thing, but that he could claim no
rent unless the tenant had the benefit of its use. If an accident
occurred whereby its productive powers were seriously impaired,
the rent was proportionately abated.'
Such is still the French
law: "If property let is totally destroyed during the subsistence
of the lease by an act of God, the lease ipso facto, comes to an
end. If the property is only partially destroyed, the lessee may
according to the nature of the circumstances, either ask that the
rent should be reduced or that the lease itself should be cancelled.
In either case he is entitled to no compensation." 2 Accidental
loss is not our subject and the point is introduced here only to
illustrate a fundamental difference of attitude in the treatment of
leasehold interests under the two great systems of jurisprudence.
Roman law, as we know it, is characterized by a mature mercantile quality, no doubt impressed upon it by the powerful class of
equites, who, in addition to their commercial pursuits, played in
the course of time a considerable part in the administration of
justice. Rome was a metropolis and city problems were familiar
to their courts. 3 The apartment house (insula) is in fact a Roman
institution.
On the other hand the English and American law relating
to leaseholds, rests on principles growing out of the mediaeval
ID. 19, 2, 9, 3 & 4; D. 19, 2, 15, 2-8; D. 19, 2, 33; BUCKLAND, TEXT BoOK
OF ROMAN LAW (192) 498; DOMAT, CIVIL LAW (Strahan's 2d ed. 1737) § 485;
2 PLANIOL, DROIT CIVIL (9th ed. 1923) 576, § 1712.
FRENCH CIVIL CODE (Wrights ed. igog) § 1722; similar provisions are in
the LA. REV. Civ. CODE (Saunders' 2d ed. Ig2o) § 2697. Cf. GERMAN CIVIL CODE

§§ 537,

188.

3D. 19, 2, 27 & 30.
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land law. By this, rent in its early forms was regarded as a
thing issuing out of the land, recoverable by real actions and
treated very similarly to an estate in land. The governing idea
was that the land was bound to pay the rent. 4 And, although in
modern law rent is regarded as a payment to which the tenant
has bound himself by contract, a principle that grew in importance
with the growth of rents reserved on leases for years, nevertheless
the earlier conception of the nature of rent has survived in doctrines otherwise difficult to explain. Hence, by the weight of
authority whatever unfortunate accident befalls the property demised during the term, rendering it unprofitable or unfit for
habitation, the lessee cannot rid himself of his obligation. It is
no answer to the demand for rent that the premises have been
injured or destroyed by fire, flood, or the public enemy.5 The
lessee is relieved from liability only when evicted, that is actually
dispossessed of the premises in whole or part by the lessor or
someone claiming by title paramount to that of the lessor. In
the former case the rent is suspended during the continuance of
the eviction, in the latter, if the eviction is partial the rent is apportioned. 6 The doctrine of frustration of a commercial adventure does not apply to a contract which creates an estate by
demise 7 The liability of the tenant in case of accidental destruction was affirmed by Chancellor Kent on the ground that having
voluntarily entered into an agreement to pay rent the tenant
ought to abide by it, as he might have provided against his re' 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW (2d ed. 1898) 130.
'Hallett v. Wylie, 3 Johns 44 (N. Y. i8o8) ; Pollard v. Schaffer, I Dall.
1
21o (Pa. 1787); Y. B. 9 Edw. III. 16 p . 30 (1335) ; Taverner's Case, I Dyer
56a (1543) ; Carter v. Cummins, 4 Vin. Abr. 387 (1665) ; Parradine v. Jane,
Aleyn 26, Style 47 (1671) ; Monk v. Cooper, 2 Str. 763 (139); Barker v.
Holtpzaffel, 4 Taunt 45 (1811) ; Holtpzaffel v. Barker, 18 Ves. 15 (811);
London & N. E. Co. v. Schlesinger, [ig6] I K. B. 20. Contra: Wattles v.
Omaha I. Co., 5o Neb. 251, 69 N. W. 785 (i897/); Coogan v. Parker, 2 S. C.
255 (1870).
'Sherman v. Williams, 113 Mass. 481 (1873); Fifth Ave. B. Co. v. Kernochan, 221 N. Y. 370, 117 N. E. 579 (1917) ; Emott v. Cole, Cro. Eliz. 255 (59o) ;
Hodgkins v. Robson, I Vent. 185 (1675); Co. Ln-r. 148; PL1:r, LAW OF CoVENANTS (Am. ed. 1834) 197; I TAYLOR ON LANDLORD & TEA-TT (9th ed. 1904)
473, § 378; WOODFALL, LANDLORD & TENANT (2oth ed. 1921) 508; 7 HOLDSWORTH,
HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW (3d ed. 1925) 274.
Whitehall Court Ltd. v. Ettinger, [i92o] I K. B. 68o.
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sponsibility; S and while this briefly represents the general view,
it assumes what is not generally true in fact, that the possibility
of destruction entered into the contemplation of the parties. If
it is actually brought to mind the point will be covered by a clause
in the lease, but usually it is an unthought of contingency which
may result in hardship to either or both parties. In days before
insurance the rule may have promoted care on the part of tenants,
but its soundest justification was given many years ago by the
Supreme Court of Massachusetts: "a lease for years is a sale of
the demised premises for the term; and unless in the case of an
express stipulation for the purpose, the lessor does not insure the
premises against inevitable accident or any other deterioration." 0
But it is unnecessary to go into particulars as the subject is touched
on here merely to illustrate the fundamental difference in approach
between the civil and common law in considering leasehold interests so as to better understand the nature of the difficulties
that beset the lessee in protecting himself against disturbances of
his enjoyment of the premises demised.
It will be conceded generally that the landlord is not to be
held accountable for the wrongful acts of other parties over
whom he has no control and for whom he is not responsible. 0
Such is the ancient law-a covenant for quiet enjoyment is against
the acts of those claiming title, not the wrongful acts of
s3 KENT CoMM. 467. Cf. Brewer, J., in Whitaker v. Hawley, 25 Kan. 674
(i88i). According to some authorities there is an exception to the rule where a
room only is leased and destroyed. Leiferman v. Olsen, 167 Ill. 93, 47 N. E. 203
(1897); Shawmut N. Bk. v. Boston, II8 Mass. 125 (1875); Liberthal v. Montgomery, 121 Mich. 369, 8o N. W. 115 (1899); Graves v. Berdan, 26 N. Y. 498
(1863). Contra: Izon v. Gorton, 5 Bing. N. C. 5oi (1839) ; Helburn v. Mofford, 7o Ky. i69 (i87o).
IFowler v. Bott, 6 Mass. 63 (i8o9).
7cConrad Seip B. Co. v. Hart, 62 Ili. App. 212 (895) ; Kistler v. Wilson,
77 Il. App. 149 (i898); Tagney v. Tabor, 2o4 Ill. App. 44o (1917); Stead v.
Crane, 2s6 Ill. App. 445 (i93o) ; O'Neil v. Pearse, 87 N. J. L. 382, 94 At). 312
(1915), af'd, 88 N. J. L. 733, 96 Atl. iio2 (i916) ; Leonard v. Gunther, 47 App.
Div. 194, 62 N. Y. Supp. 99 (I9oo) ; Oakford v. Nixon, 177 Pa. 76, 35 Atl. 588
(1896) ; Blauvelt v. Powell, 59 Hun. 179, 13 N. Y. Supp. 439 (189i) ; Shapiro v.
Malarkey, 278 Pa. 78, 122 At). 341 (1923) ; Girard Trust Co. v. Raiguel, 93 Pa.
Super. 13 (1928); Ai.gelo v. Deutser, 30 S. W. (2d) 707 (Tex. 1930). In
Barns v. Wilson, ii6 Pa. 303, 9 Atl. 437 (1887) the removal of a party wall by
an adjoining owner did not constitute an eviction that would relieve the tenant
from rent. Contra: Bentley v. Sill, 35 Ill. 415 (1864).
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strangers." Thus, in an action for rent it was held no defense
that patrons of the landlord's adjoining shop loitered in front
of defendant's show window obstructing the view and indulged
in loud talk. The space in front of the window was not under
the control of the plaintiff and he could not be held responsible
for the presence of persons collecting there. 1 2 The tenant is not
supposed to be altogether spineless. An injury to an occupant
of land in the reasonable enjoyment of the property of which he
is in possession, by noise or other means of disturbance, is a
nuisance and remediable as such at law or in equity without regard to the quality of the tenure.' 3 The lessee may have an injunction to restrain a nuisance which is injurious to his health
and comfort,' 4 or an action for the damages sustained during his
tenancy resulting from the maintenance of the nuisance. 15 So
much may be conceded. But is this all? Experienced individuals
regard litigation as a calamity. Aside from its expense, it means,
in the inferior courts of this great democracy, personal humiliation
and waste of time. A quarrel with a neighbor usually develops
into a feud that lasts until the expiration of the tenancy. With
a reasonable excuse to move, prudent persons would rather leave
the neighborhood than remain in perpetual controversy with those
whose tastes differ and interests conflict. Bui the lessor also is
concerned with the good reputation of the premises under lease,
1Y. B. 22 Hen. VI, 52, pl. 26 (1443); 26 Hen. VIII, 3, pl. II (1534);
2 Saund. (Wins. 2d Am. ed. 1816) 175e (1669); Dudley v.
Folliott, 3 T. R. 584 (1790) ; PLArr, op. cit. supra note 6, 313.
'Eagle v. Matthews, 98 Kan. 715, i6o Pac. 211 (1916) ; Volkmar v. Vladi,
20 BERKS Co. L. J. 218 (Pa. 1928).

Wotton v. Hele,

" Off v. Exposition Coaster, Inc., 336 Ill. ao, 167 N. E. 782 ('929); Du227 Ky. 566, 13 S. W. (2d) 767 (1929) ; People v. Hess,

laney v. Fitzgerald,

IIo Misc. 76, 179 N. Y. Supp. 734 (i92o) ; Prendergast v. Wells, 257 Pa. 547,

zoi AtI. 826 (1917); Soltau v. DeHeld. 2 Sim. (x. s.) 133 (1851); Inchbald v.
Barrington, L. R. 4 Ch. App. 388 (1869). Cf. Pig'n Whistle S. Shop v. Keith,
167 Ga. 735, 146 S. E. 455 (1928) ; Rogers v. Elliott, 146 Mass. 349, 15 N. E. 768
(1888) ; Tarr v. Hopewell Country Club, 153 Wash. 214, 279 Pac. 594 (1929).
"4State v. King, 46 La. Ann. 78, 14 So. 423 (1894) ; Ingraham v. Dunnell,
5 ,fetc. 118 (Mass. 1842) ; DeLaney v. Blizzard, 5 Hun 7 (N. Y. 1876) ; Grantham v. Gibson, 41 Wash. 125, 83 Pac. 14 (19o5) ; Jones v. Chappell, L. R. 20
Eq. 539 (1875).
'Ackerman v. Ellis, 81 N. J. L. I, 79 Ati. 883 (1911); Bly v. Edison Electric Co., 172 N. Y. 1, 64 N. E. 745 (19o2); Pritchard v. Haynes, 92 App. Div.
178, 87 N. Y. Supp. 2-25 (r9o4); Smith v. Phillips, 8 Phila. io (Pa. I871);
Jenkins v. Jackson, 40 Ch. D. 71 (I888).
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and in the case of a subdivided building or an apartment house
where he has been responsible for bringing incongruous elements
into juxtaposition, is there no formula by which his interest in
maintaining peace and good will throughout his domain may be
transmuted into a duty to see that the manners or occupations
of some of his lessees shall not cause unreasonable discomfort to
the others?
To such a query the common law would give a short answer.
The tenant has the possession, and possession is single and exclusive.", The landlord's right is confined to the redress of injuries to the reversionary interest, since he has no present possession. 7 In almost all cases it is the person in occupation who is
prima facie entitled to maintain an action for an injury done the
property, and when an injury is caused to third persons by the state
of the premises, he it is who is usually held liable."8 If intolerable
conditions compel the tenant to remove from the premises can he
find grounds for avoiding his lease? By the early cases an eviction of the tenant by the landlord from the whole or a part of
the premises suspended the rent, but the plea had to state an expulsion of the lessee by the lessor and a keeping him out of possession until after the rent became due, otherwise it was bad. A
trespass by the lessor did not suspend the rent. 9 Physical dispossession was contemplated and so Chancellor Kent understood
when he wrote: "No offensive or outrageous conduct on the part
of the landlord, as by erecting a nuisance in the neighborhood of
the demised premises will be sufficient." 20 Such indeed was the
decision of the supreme court of New York in the case of Dyeit
v. Pendleton,2- but on appeal to the court of errors judgment was
" POLLOCK & WRIGHT ESSAY ON POSSESSION (i888) 21, 47.
=Mumford v. Oxford W. & W. R. Co., I H. & N. 34 (1856); Shelfer v.
Elcctric Co., [1895] i Ch. 287; White v. London General Omnibus Co. (1914)
58 So1. J. 339.
'"¥
OODFALL, LANDLORD & TENANT (2=th ed. 1921) 888; I TIFFANY, LANDLORD & TENANT (1910) 789, § 120.
"Vatel v. Herner, I Hilton 149 (N. Y. 1856) ; Bennet v. Bittle, 4 Rawle
339 (Pa. 1834); Cibel & Hill's Case, Leon. iio (1587) ; Asconglis' Case, 9 Co.
133 (i611) ; Timbrell v. Bullock, Style 446 (I655) ; Salmon v. Smith, I Saund.
(Wnrms. 2d Am. ed. 1816) 2o2 at 204 (i668) ; Roper v. Lloyd, I T. Jones 148
(1678) ; Hunt v. Cope, I Cowp. 242 (1775).
KENT CoMM. 464.
'8 Cow. 727 (N. Y. 1826), rez'g 4 Cow. 58I (N. Y. 1825).
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reversed, and Dyett v. Pendleton became a leading case, marking
a departure from ancient precedent and establishing a basis for
the development of new principles.
The action was covenant on a lease of two rooms in a house
in New York City. The lessee pleaded that he had been ejected
and expelled by the lessor and on the trial offered to prove that
the lessor had introduced prostitutes into other parts of the house
who by their noisy and riotous proceedings had disturbed the
sleep of other occupants and brought the house into ill repute in
the neighborhood so that defendant was compelled to leave. The
trial judge excluded this evidence and, after a verdict for plaintiff,
the ruling was sustained on motion for a new trial. There was
no actual physical eviction, said the court, not even a trespass, as
the acts complained of were committed in a different part of the
house. The disturbance suffered by the lessee was in the nature
of a nuisance and his remedy was to call in the police who would
have taken the plaintiff and his associates into custody and punished them by fine and imprisonment. The case was then taken to
the court of Errors, which at that time was composed of the State
Senate, the Chancellor and the Justices of the Supreme Court, and
there the vote was sixteen to six for reversal. Senator Colden,
speaking for affirmance, said in effect, that if the lessee, finding
himself temporarily disturbed by the lessor's conduct and abandoning the premises, is to be exonerated from the payment of rent, a
new and extensive chapter will be introduced in the law of landlord and tenant. If the landlord's encouragement or practice of
lewdness under the same roof would warrant an abdication by the
tenant and release him from his covenant to pay rent, there is no
reason why, if the landlord should by any other means render the
occupation inconvenient or uncomfortable the same consequences
should not ensue. "If the landlord should happen to have the
plague of a scolding wife under the same roof with his tenant,
the tenant might feel himself authorized to leave the premises
and claim an exoneration from the payment of rent." A decision
of this nature, he felt, would afford grounds for perpetual contentions. If litigation is objectionable per se, the number of cases
that trace their ancestry to the view of the majority in this decision

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

714

would seem to justify the senator's forebodings. It is a curious
and common judicial paradox that a judge whose principal function is to decide cases in the interest of justice should shrink from
the thought of increasing the instances in which justice is to be
administered. The new chapter was, in fact, introduced into the
law and Senator Spencer gave it a name which appears in his
opinion for reversal: the evidence, he thought, should have been
received because it tended to establish a "constructive eviction."
Now "constructive eviction" is a phrase that is open to the objection that it is self-contradictory and lacking in that scientific precision which is an aid to clear thinking. But Anglo-American
law has never been interested in clarity of thought-if it could see
its way to a practical result. In the earnest if somewhat tenuous
arguments of the court it is noticeable that in the end moral considerations were decisive. Perhaps it was time. The decisions
of the New York Court of Errors when the senators sat on appeals have at times been referred to contemptuously; but in this
instance at least, the social value of their judgment has been confirmed by the passage of the years.2 2 Indeed Senator Spencer in
his opinion uses these frank and significant words: "When this
court of last resort, was declared to consist of senators, with the
chancellor and judges, it must have occurred, that the largest
proportion of its members would be citizens not belonging to
the legal profession. And it must, therefore, have been intended
to collect here, a body of sound practical common sense, which
would not overthrow law, but which would apply the principles
and reasons of the law according to the justice of each case, without regard to the technical refinements and arbitrary and fictitious
rules, which will always grow upon professional men."
Dyett v. Pendleton 23 has been discussed at some length not
only because it is the leading American case but because its
v. Bennett, 4 Colo. App. 252, 35 Pac. 748 (1894) ; Billamy v. Smith, 4
135 (Del. 1876);
App. 326 (1920); Lancashire v. Garford
Hartenbauer v. Brumbaugh, 220 Ill.
M. Co., ig Mo. App. 418, 203 S. W. 668 (i918) ; Weiler v. Pancoast, 71 N. J.
L. 414, 58 At. io84 (19o4) ; Stewart v. Forst, i5 Misc. 621, 37 N. Y. Supp. 215
(1876); Cushman v. Thompson, 58 Misc. 539, io9 N. Y. Supp. 757 (1908);
Phyfe v. Dale, 72 Misc. 383, 13o N. Y. Supp. 231 (i9II); Herbert R. Co. v.
Petchett, 8 Pa. D. & C. 418 (1926).
' Supra note 21.
'Lay

Houst.

113 (Del. 1870); Rowbotham v. Pearce, 5 Houst
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boundaries were not at first clearly understood. It was described
as an extreme case; one that "carried the doctrine of eviction to
its utmost verge." 24 In Massachusetts it was said that it had
been modified if not overruled by later decisions. 2
But upon
that point the learned court was mistaken. Dyett v. Pendleton 26
has met with distinct approval within its true limits.27 One of
these limits, about which there is that comparative unanimity
which marks a well settled principle is that there must be an
abandonment of possession by the lessee, who cannot remain in
possession and shield himself from the payment of rent by reason
of the wrongful acts of the landlord. 2' Another of the limits,
and one far more difficult in application, is that the lessor must
have caused or connived at the nuisance of which the lessee complains.

29

The English cases are few in number and treat problems of
this general nature with much reserve. While it is not necessary
that there should be an actual physical expulsion of the tenant,
an act to constitute an eviction must be, in the words of Jervis,
C. J., in Upton v. Townsend,30 "not a mere trespass and nothing
more, but something of a grave and permanent character done by
the landlord with the intention of depriving the tenant of the en" Etheridge v. Osborn, 12 Wend. 529 (N. Y. 1834) ; Royce v. Guggenheim,
io6 MXfass. 2O (i87o) ; Gilhooley v. Washington, 4 N. Y. 217 (1850).
'DeWitt v. Pierson, 112 Mass. 8 (1873) ; see Gray v. Graff, 8 Mo. App.
329 (1880).
-Supra note 21.
-Kinney v. Libbey, 54 Misc. 595, 1O4 N. Y. Supp. 863 (1907) ; Bergman v.
Papia, 1O3 Misc. 863, lO9 N. Y. Supp. 856 (igog) ; and cases in note 22.
Endicott v. Thorne, iII Conn. 697, 151 Atl. 187 (193o) ; Automobile Supply Co. v. Scene-in-Action Corp., 340 Ill. 196, 172 N\. E. 35 (1930) ; Ogilvie v.
Hull, 5 Hill 52 (N. Y. 1843) ; Edgerton v. Page, 2o N. Y. 281 (1859); Harper
v. Jackson, 240 Pa. 312, 87 At. 430 (1913) ; Weinstein v. Barrasso, 139 Tenn. 393,
2o2 S. W. 92o (1918), I9i8D L. R. A. 1174 and note; Angelo v. Deutser, 30 S. V.
(zd) 7o7 (Tex. i93o). But the lessee may recoup or counterclaim for damages.
Parrish v. Studebaker, So Cal. App. 719, 195 Pac. 721 (i92o) ; Seltz v. Stafford,
284 Ill.
6Io, 12o N. E. 462 (1918); City of New York v. Pike Realty Co., 247
N. Y. 245, 16o N. E. 359 (1928) ; Depuy v. Silver, i PA. L. J. REP. 385 (Clark,
1843).
Paterson v. Bridges, 16 Ala. App. 54 (1917) ; Cougle v. Deasmore, 57 Ill.
App. 591 (I894) ; Wolf v. Epstein, 71 Ore. I, 140 Pac. 751 (1914) ; DeWitt v.
Pierson, 112 Mass. 8 (1873) ; Katz v. Duffy, 261 Mass. 149, 158 N. E. 264 (1927) ;
Gilhooley v. Washington, 4 N. Y. 217 (i85o); Townsend v. Gilsey, i Sweeny
155 (N. Y. 1869).
7 C. B. 30 (i855).
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joyment of the demised premises." In that case the landlord
rebuilt after a fire, with the tenant's consent, in an altered form
and it was held an eviction as to sub-tenants. So railing off a
portion of the garden demised with the house was held an eviction. 3 1 On the other hand the pulling down of a summer house
by the landlord was held a mere trespass. 32 The case that is
nearest in point of fact is Jaeger v.Mansions Consolidated,3 3 in
which the plaintiff was tenant of a residential flat in a building
under a form of lease, used in the case of all the tenancies, that
the lessee would not permit the premises to be used for any unlawful or immoral purpose. The action was brought alleging
that some of the flats were being used for immoral purposes and
praying for an injunction to prevent the owners from permitting
the flats to be so used as to cause a nuisance to the plaintiff. To
a counterclaim for rent the defendant replied that further occupation had been rendered impossible and he had left the premises.
It was urged on a preliminary point of law that no cause of
action was disclosed but it was held in the Court of Appeal that
the case ought to go to trial to determine whether in fact the
landlord permitted the offending tenants to do the acts complained
of. If so, then since it was part of the general scheme that these
flats should be respectably occupied, the occupation of parts of
the building with the knowledge and assent of the landlord for
improper purposes would be a violation of such scheme and render
him as clearly liable to an injunction as if he had entered into
an express agreement to that effect. In the court below the further
point was made that the conduct of the lessor might constitute
a breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment. Buckley, J., obSmith v. Raleigh, 3 Campb. 513 (1814).

Where the landlord gave notice

to sub-tenants to quit and one did quit it was held an eviction of the principal
tenant. Burn v. Phelps, i Stark (N. P.) 75 (815). So also the service of a
declaration in ejectment. Jones v. Carter, 15 M. & IV.718 (1846).
l Hurt v. Cope, Cowp. 242 (1775). So also where landlord removed explosives, Newly v. Sharpe, 8 Ch. D. 39 (1878). So where the landlord put off the
premises an agent of the tenant on personal grounds. Henderson v. Mears
(i859) 5 Jur. (N. s.) 7o9, (i858-9) 7 W. R. 554. So putting a custodian in
charge of abandoned premises. Wheeler v. Stevenson, 6 H. & N. 155 (i86o) ;
Griffths v. Hodges, i C. & P. 419 (1824). In Hart v. Windsor, 12 M. & W.
(1843), an action for rent, a plea that because the house was infested with bugs
defendant quitted possession was held bad, distinguishing Smith v. Marrable, ii
M. & NV.5 (1843), a lease of a furnished house.
3' (1903)

87 LAw TIMEs 69o.
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served that such a covenant had reference to disturbances of a
physical and not of a metaphysical nature. However, an interference with the tenant's use of the halls, stairs and lights would
be within the rule. This phase of the case is not discussed by
the Court of Appeal. The decision is an ingenious and significant
extension of the principle developed in equity of enforcing restrictive agreements as to the use of land. 34 In Malzy v. Eichhok,

3

5

part of the ground floor of a building was leased as a

restaurant by the defendant with a covenant for quiet enjoyment.
Another room in the front of the building was leased to another
tenant who covenanted not to permit any disturbance of the landlord or his tenants. This tenant permitted mock auctions on his
premises which led to great disorder and finally to police interference. The restaurant keeper sued the other tenant and the
landlord and was awarded a verdict for damages. The landlord
alone appealed. There was no general scheme for the use of the
building and the Court of Appeal held that the landlord was not
liable because he knew that there was a nuisance and did not take
any active steps to prevent what was being done by using all the
powers that he might have under any agreements with other persons for the benefit of the plaintiff. Authorization or participation in the act done was essential to render him liable. It seemed
to be agreed that to constitute a breach of the covenant for quiet
enjoyment there must be some physical disturbance of or interference with the lessee."o
The American courts have made such generous use of the
convenient if nebulous phrase "constructive eviction" that it would
be impossible in a brief paper to review all the various groups of
decisions where the acts of the landlord or his omission to act
have been held such as to justify the tenant in relinquishing pos3 See Hudson v. Cripps, [I86] i Ch. -65, where an injunction was granted
restraining the change of part of residential flat building into a club and Gedge v.
Bartlett, 17 T. L. R. 43 (i9oo) ; Alexander v. Mansions Proprietary, Ltd., i6
Cf. Postal Tel. C. Co. v. Western Union T. Co., i55 Ill.
T. L. R. I43i (900).
335, 40 N. E. 587 (1895) ; Beebe v. Tyra, 49 Wash. 157, 94 Pac. 94o (9o8);
Davis v. Town Properties Investment Corporation, Ltd., [1903] I Ch. 797.
' [I916] 2 K. B. 308.
'Jenkins v. Jackson, 40 Ch. D. 71 (1888) ; Browne v. Flower, [i9i] i Ch.
219. Cf. Grosvenor Hotel Co. v. Hamilton, [1894] 2 Q. B. 836.
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session. Logically an eviction by the landlord is an affirmative
act and the use of the term should be confined to acts of commission involving an intentional and wrongful interruption of the
possession or a permanent and substantial interference with the
beneficial use,3 7 remembering that where the wrongful acts of
the lessor are such as will naturally and probably exclude the
lessee from possession or enjoyment of the premises the law will
presume an intent to do so, and if the natural consequence follows,
the acts will be regarded as an eviction.38
Nevertheless there
are other decisions where the courts have, in fact, extended the
doctrine to include acts of omission. Familiar instances occur
where a failure to furnish heat or other services according to the
terms of the contract renders the premises unfit for the purpose
for which they were leased. 39 And, although this extension of
the application of the word has been criticized as calculated to
obscure the true nature of an eviction,4 0 it has, nevertheless, been
applied in cases where there was no specific agreement to supply
what was regarded as an essential service. 4 1 In New York, in
the case of an apartment house, the presence of vermin has been
'Warren v. Wagner, 75 Ala. 188 (1883); Lewis v. Hughes, 12 Colo. 208,
2o Pac. 621 (i888) ; Central B. College v. Rutherford, 47 Colo. 277, 107 Pac.
279 (igio); Longwood T. Co. v. Doyle, 267 Mass. 368, 166 N. E. 634 (1929);
Blaustein v. Pincus, 47 Mont. 2o2, 131 Pac. 1O64 (1913) ; Vanderbilt v. Persse,

3 E. D. Smith, 428 (N. Y. 1854) ; Edgerton v. Page, I Hilton, 320 (N. Y. 1857) ;
Humes v. Gardner, 22 Misc. 333, 49 N. Y. Supp. 147 (1898) ; Huber v. Ryan,
26 Misc. 428, 56 N. Y. Supp. I3.- (1899) ; Two Rector St. Corp. v. Blein, 226
App. Div. 73, 234 N. Y. Supp. 400 (1929); Hoeveler v. Fleming, 91 Pa. 322
(1879) ; McCandless v. Findley, 86 Pa. Super. 288 (1926).
38 Scally v. Shute, i32 Mass. 367 (1882); Buchanan v. Orange, 118 Va. 511,
88 S. E. 52 (i9i6). See further Levitzky v. Canning, 33 Cal. 299 (1867) ; Boyer
v. Commercial B. I. Co., Iio Iowa 491, 81 N. W. 72o (19oo) ; Royce v. Guggenheim, lo6 Mass. 201 (1870) ; Case v. Minot, 158 Mass. 577, 33 N. E. 7o0
(1893); Boston Veterinary Hospital v. Kiley, 219 Mass. 533, lO7 N. E. 426
(1914); Jackson v. Eddy, 12 Mo. 20 (1848); Tallman v. Murphy, 12o N. Y.
345, 24 N. E.716 (i8go).
Laffey v. Woodhull, 256 Ill. App. 325 (193o) ; Nesson v. Adams, 212 Mass.
429, 99 N. E. 93 (1912) ; Conroy v. Toomay, 234 Mass. 384, 125 N. E. 568
(I92O); Minneapolis Co-operative Co. v. Williamson, 51 Minn. 53, 52 N. V.
986 (1892) ; Siebold v. Heyman, 12o N. Y. Supp. IO5 (19o9) ; Russell v. Olson,
22 N. D. 410, 133 N. W. 1O3O (1911); McSorley v. Allen, 36 Pa. Super. 271
(19o8); Wasserman v. Levy, 29 Pa. D. R. 55 (1919); Buchanan v. Orange,

sripra note 38. Cf. Automobile Supply Co. v. Scene-in-Action Corp., supra
note 28; Jones v. Silverman, 95 Pa. Super. 336 (1928).
02 TIFFANY, LANDLORD & TENANT (1910) 1271.
"Berlinger v. Macdonald, 149 App. Div. 5, 133 N. Y. Supp. 522 (1912);
Flechner v. Douglass, 136 -isc. 57, 239 N. Y. Supp. 121 (1929).
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regarded as an act of omission essentially interfering with the
tenants' enjoyment and justifying an abandonment of possession. 42 But the rule is stated otherwise in Massachusetts where
the presence of large numbers of cockroaches which the lessor
unsuccessfully attempted to exterminate, was held not to amount
to a constructive eviction, 4 3 applying the ordinary rule that the
lease of a building for a dwelling implies no covenant that it is
fit for occupation.

44

The nature and extent of the disturbances coming from other
rooms or adjacent property owned or controlled by the landlord
which will justify a tenant in quitting the premises and refusing
to be bound further by the lease is necessarily, in most cases, a
difficult question of fact. On the one hand it is agreed that the
use of part of a building by one tenant which is unpleasant and
inconvenient to another tenant but with which the landlord has
nothing to do is not an eviction. 4 5 On the other hand it has been
held that where a portion of a building has been expressly leased
for a particular use by the tenant, the landlord is not permitted to
lease a portion of the premises for a use which, although not a
nuisance in itself, will totally deprive the first tenant of the benefit
' Batterman v. Levenson, io,2 Misc. 92, 168 N. Y. Supp. 197 (1917); Madden
v. Bullock, 115 N. Y. Supp. 723 (I9o9); Barnard Realty Co. v. Bonwit, I55
App. Div. 182, 139 N. Y. Supp. lO5O (913) ; Streep v. Simpson, 8o Misc. 666, 141
N. Y. Supp. 863 (1913). Contra: Pomeroy v. Tyler, 9 N. Y. St. Rep. 514
(1887) ; Jacobs v. Morand, 59 Misc. 200, i1o N. Y. Supp. 208 (1908) ; and cf.
Westlake v. DeGraw, 25 Wend. 669 (N. Y. 1841) ; Cushman v. Bohl, 153 N. Y.
Supp. 94 (1915); Wainwright v. Helmer, 193 N. Y. Supp. 653 (1922).
' Hopkins v. Murphy, 233 Mass. 476, 124 N. E. 252 (1gi9); Luch v. Husbands, 152 At. 729 (Del. 193o) ; Gunther v. Oliver, 98 N. J. L. 563, 117 Ad. 402

(19-).

"Fisher v. Lighthall, 4 Mackey 82 (D. C. 1885) ; Lucas v. Coulter, 1o4 Ind.
8I, 3 N. E. 622 (I85) ; McKeon v. Cutter, 156 Mass. 296, 31 N. E. 389 (892) ;
Griffin v. Freeborn, 18I Mo. App. 2o3, 168 S. W. 219 (1914); Daly v. Wise, 132
N. Y. 3o6, 3o N. E. 837 (1892) ; Reeves v. McComeskey, 168 Pa. 57, 27 At.
884 (895) ; Lane v. Cox, [1897] I Q. B. 415. Otherwise where the lease is of
a furnished house, Young v. Povich, 121 Me. 141, I16 At. 26 (1922-); Ingalls v.
Hobbs, 156 Mass. 348, 31 N. E. 286 (1892) ; Smith v. Marrable, supra note 32;
Campbell v. Lord Wenlock, 4 F. & F. 716 (1866).
' Bilicke v. Janss, 14 Cal. App. 342, 112 Pac. 201 (igio) ; Wood's Theatre
v. North Amer. Union, 246 Ill. App. 521 (1927); Voss v. Silvester, 2o3 Mass. 233,
89 N. E. 241 (i9O9) ; French v. Pettingill, 128 Mo. App. 156, 106 S. W. 575

(i9O7) ; 'Mortimer v. Bruner, 6 Bosw. 653 (N. Y. i86o) ; Leonard v. Gunther,
1o; Martens v. Sloane, 132 App. Div. 114, ii6 N. Y. Supp. 512
(19o9); Wilkes-Barre R. Co. v. Levy, 114 N. Y. Supp. 713 (19o); Weinstein
v. Barrasso, supra note 28; Toy v. Olinger, 173 Wis. 277, i81 N. W. 295 (1921).

supra note
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of his lease. 46 Thus, in one case where the owners of a building in
which they conducted a furniture store leased space in the store
for the sale of music and musical instruments and thereafter discontinued the furniture business and leased the space for a meat
market and grocery store the first lessee was held entitled to an
injunction to restrain such use. Said the court:
"Plaintiff deals in musical instruments, inclusive of
Victrolas and records, and it is well known that purchasers
desire a demonstration. A selection from Chopin, on a
'Victrola played to the accompaniment of a cleaver cracking
bones on a butcher's block, might not detract from the sale
of meat but would seriously interfere with the music business. No music dealer with sense, would expect to be able
to carry on his business in a butcher's shop. The carcass
of a hog, hung by the heels, with opened body and bloody
snout, may not look out of place in a butcher's shop, but
wholly out of place and repulsive in the same room with a
music store." 47
With this may be contrasted the view taken in a Pennsyl-vania case where a dentist leased rooms for a term of years on
the second floor of a building known and used exclusively as an
office building although there was no express agreement to rent
for offices exclusively. A lease of this building as a hotel making
it undesirable and unfit as a location for the tenant's business was
held not to be a breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment which,
the court said, did not extend to the act of the landlord in making
a different use of that part of his property not demised, there
being no disturbance of the tenant's possession.4 s A nuisance
maintained by the lessor injurious to the lessee and destructive
40Halligan v. Wade, 21 Ill. 470 (1859) ; Kesner v. Consumers Co., 255 Ill.
App. 216 (1929) ; Phoenix L. & I. Co. v. Seidel, 135 Mo. App. i85, ii5 S. W.
IO7O (i9o8); Duff v. Hart, 16 N. Y. Supp. 163 (i891) ; Wade v. Herndl, 127
Wis. 544, 1o7 N. AV. 4 (i9o6). The closing of a hotel or market house in which
tenant has rented a stand or stall will amount to an eviction, Coulter v. Norton,
ioo Mich. 389, 59 N. W. 163 (1894) ; Denison v. Ford, 7 Daly 384 (N. Y. 1878).
Cf. Kelly v. United States, 69 Ct. Cl. 22o (i93o).
'rGrinnell v. Asinliewiez, 241 Mich. i86, 216 N. W. 388 (1927).
"sTucker v. DuPuy, 210 Pa. 461, 6o Atl. 4 (Igo4) ; Gray v. Gaff, 8 Mo.
App. 329 (i So).

THE DISTURBED TENANT

of his comfort is another matter.40 Thus, where a few weeks
after the tenant had moved into a flat the landlord opened a public
bowling alley directly under the rooms occupied by him which
was used all day and late into the night, the evidence was held
sufficient to justify the tenant in quitting the premises.50 But
to constitute an eviction such injuries must of course be substantial. 5 1
In the case of residential apartments the proprietor is in a
very different position from that of the innkeeper who is bound
to give reasonable attention and care to the convenience and comfort of his guests.3 2 A room in an inn occupied by a guest is
not in a legal sense his dwelling house for notwithstanding his
occupancy it is the house of the innkeeper; there is not the conventional relation of landlord and tenant for there is no contract
as to the realty. 53 The fact that there is nothing unusual or inconsistent in a building having a double character being simultaneously a hotel and an apartment house has probably contributed
to some popular misconceptions as to the extent of the lessor's
duties, but where specific rooms are leased for a precise time at
a definite rate so separated from the other rooms in the house as
to give the occupant full possession and control they become in
fact and law the separate tenement of the lessee. 5 4 In the Michigan
Vyse v. Russell, I6 Misc. 53, 37 N. Y. Supp. 683 (1896); Cohen v.
Dupont, i Sandf. 26o (N. Y. 1848) ; Fox v. Murdock-, 58 Misc. 2o, iog N. Y.
Supp. io8 (i9o8); Onward Construction Co. v. Harris, I44 N. Y. Supp. 318
(913).
'
Donovan v. Koehler, II9 App. Div. 51, 103 N. Y. Supp. 935 (907).
"Molineux v. Hurburt, 79 Conn. 243, 64 At. 350 (i9o6) ; McLaughlin v.
Bohn, 20 Misc. 338, 45 N. Y. Supp. 745 (I897) ; Finck v. Rogers, 30 Misc. 23,
62 N. Y. Supp. 996 (1899); Haas v. Ketcham, 87 N. Y. Supp. 411 (1904);
Greenwald v. Shustek, i69 N. Y. Supp. 98 (1918) ; Ewing v. Cattman, 9 Pa.
Super. 444 (1899) ; Cline v. Altose, 29o Pac. 809 (Wash., i93o).
' Lehnen v. Hines & Co., 88 Kan. 58, 127 Pac. 612 (1912) ; Raider v. Dixie
Inn, 198 Ky. 152, 248 S. W. 229 (1923) ; Holden v. Carraher, i5 Mass. 392,
8I N. E. 261 (i9o7) ; Dalzell v. Dean Hotel Co., 193 Mo. App. 379, i86 S. W. 41
(1916) ; Rommel v. Schambacher, 120 Pa. 579, II Atl. 779 (887).
'Foster v. State, 84 Ala. 451, 4 So. 833 (1887) ; Davis v. Gray, 141 Mass.
531, 6 N. E. 549 (1886) ; Dixon v. Robbins, -246 N. Y. i69, I58 N. E. 63 (i92/) ;
Alsberg v. Lucerne Hotel Co., 46 'Misc. 617, 92 N. Y. Supp. 85I (i9oS) ; Crapo
v. Rockwell, 48 Misc. I, 94 N. Y. Supp. i12 (i9o5) ; DeWolf v. Ford, 193
N. Y. 397, 86 N. E. 527 (i98); Hackett'v. Bell 0. Co., i8i App. Div. 535,
169 N. Y. Supp. 114 (i918).
"Porter v. Merrill, I24 Mass. 534 (1878) : Cromwell v. Stephens, 2 Daly
i5 (N. Y. 1867); Shearman v. Iroquois Hotel Co., 42 Misc. 217, 85 N. Y. Supp.
365 (i9o3) ; Alsberg v. Lucerne Hotel Co., 46 Misc. 617, 92 N. Y. Supp. 851
(9o5).
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case of Stewart v. Lawson '5 the action was to recover the rent
of a flat from the tenant who had removed therefrom before the
expiration of his term. The defendant claimed that the conduct
and language of some of the other tenants were so offensive that
he could not remain. It was held that there was no eviction which
would bar a recovery of the rent, there being no evidence that
the plaintiff encouraged the disturbance; at most she suffered it
to continue. Under the covenant for quiet enjoyment the lessor
incurred no liability for disturbance through the wrongful conduct of third persons. There was a clause in the lease requiring
the family and visitors of the lessee to conduct themselves peaceably and not become a nuisance to other tenants and it was urged
that the lessor might have ejected the objectionable parties as
their leases contained the same clause, but the court held that the
presence of this clause did not alter the rule. In Sefton v.
Juilliard. the trial court held that there was sufficient proof to
show that the apartment leased and occupied by the defendant
was rendered untenantable by reason of constant piano playing
by another tenant occupying the apartment directly underneath
that of defendant. The rules at the end of the lease provided
against conduct annoying or disturbing to occupants of the building and forbade practicing on musical instruments. In reversing
judgment for defendant the New York Supreme Court said that
the lease merely gave the landlord an option to terminate the
lease for a violation of the rules regulating the use of the premises, but that was not a covenant that such option would be exercised whenever a violation occurred. The landlord was not
bound to expel one tenant for the benefit of another. So it has
been said in Illinois: "These rules are simply restrictions by the
lessor.

.

.

.

If the lessee desired an express stipulation or cove-

nant on the part of the landlord touching the conduct of other
tenants it should have been incorporated in the lease." '- A contrary view was taken in a Texas case where the lease of an apartment contained a rule prohibiting the keeping of animals in the
ig9 Mich. 497, i65 N. W. 716 (I917), L. R. A. 1918D 394 and note.
"46 Misc. 68, 91 N. Y. Supp. 348 (904).
' A. H. Woods Theatre v. North American Union, 246 Ill. App. 521 (1927)
Eley v. L. & L. Mfg. Co., 30 Ga. App. 595, S S. E. 583 (1923).
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building. There the lessor's failure to require a co-tenant to
remove a dog from the building after notice, was held to entitle
the lessee to move before the expiration of his lease and claim
an eviction.s Naturally a much stronger case for the tenant
arises when the landlord expressly agrees in the lease to make
and enforce reasonable rules for the welfare of the tenants and
conduct the building in a first class manner, and among the rules
is one that no tenant shall disturb or annoy other tenants by
unseemly or untimely noises. Having assumed this obligation
it is the landlord's duty to secure to the lessee the quiet enjoyment
to which he is entitled by enforcing the rules and a failure to act
5
on a well grounded complaint works an eviction. 0
There may be no provision in the lease as to the use of the
premises. Such a case was recently considered in Wisconsin on
an appeal from an order denying an injunction to restrain the
owners of a two-family apartment house from using any portion
of the premises for any other purpose than as a private residence. 60 The plaintiff was the lessee of the lower floor apartment
for a term of years and occupied the premises with his family.
Before the lease expired the defendants made a contract to sell
the property to a college fraternity which moved its furniture
into the upper apartment. It was alleged that the use of the
premises as a club house by exuberant and irresponsible young
men given to boisterous habits and "addicted to the use of vibrant
and sonorous musical instruments" would deprive the plaintiff of
the beneficial enjoyment of his lease. There was no provision
in the lease that the building should be used for residence purposes only but it was urged that such a covenant would be implied
from the fact that the building was constructed for residential
purposes. The Supreme Court, however, found that in Hudson
v. Cripps,61 and other English cases cited, all the leases provided
that the premises should not be used except as dwellings, and
Maple Terrace Apartment Co. v. Simpson, 22 S. V. (2d) 698 (Texas Civ.
App. 1929) ; Keenan v. Flanigan, 157 La. 750, 103 So. 30 (0925).

"'Herbert Realty Co. v. Petschett, 8 Pa. D. & C. 418 (1926).
'Hannan v. Harper, 189 Wis. 588, 2o8 N. W. 255 (1926). Followed and
approved, Bruckner v. Helfaer, 197 Wis. 582, 222 N. W. 790 (1929).
' Supra note 34.
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that there was no authority for the proposition that such a covenant could be implied from the purpose to which alone the premises had been previously applied. Nevertheless the order of the
court below was reversed and the cause remanded with instructions to grant a temporary injunction. If, said the court, the
occupancy of the upper flat by the college fraternity as a club
and headquarters rendered the lower flat unsuitable for residential purposes the result would amount to a breach of the
covenant for quiet enjoyment. It was unnecessary, as the lower
court thought, to hold that college students as a class were not
law abiding for it was enough if the purposes, objects and activities of the fraternity were incompatible with the recognized
incidents of home life such as privacy, quiet and repose. Activities
conforming in every respect to proper conduct when confined to
fraternity headquarters give rise to noises and disturbances incompatible with family life in such close proximity to a club. It
will be noted that in this case no actual disturbance of the lessee
was alleged or proved, and, ordinarily, injunctions are not granted
merely to allay the fears and apprehensions of the parties; it
should be made to appear that real and substantial injury to rights
of property are imminent and probable.12 The conclusion reached
is put, naively, on "the intuitive judgment of every member of a
household of ordinary susceptibilities."
Where part of the premises are used by their occupants for
unlawful purposes which constitute a nuisance, the cases are not
in agreement as to how far the tenant must trace a connection of
the landlord with such proceedings in order to justify an abandonment of the lease. If the lewd conduct that makes living conditions
intolerable for a respectable family is that of the landlord himself
there is, as was decided in Dyett v. Pendletonj 3 a constructive
eviction. But when the unlawful conduct is that of co-tenants
there are decisions conflicting in result although professing ad'In re Penn Development Co., 22o Fed. 222 (S. D. Cal. 1915), and the
many cases cited in 32 C. J. 43.
mSupra note 21; Allot v. Bowers, 168 Ill. App. 573 (1912) ; Cf. Meeks v.
Bowerman, i Daly 1O0 (N. Y. 1861) where the premises had formerly been
occupied for immoral purposes. Molineux v. Hurlburt, 79 Conn. 243, 64 AtI.
350 (19o6), evidence not sufficiently explicit.
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herence to the same general principles. In one group it is held
that the injured lessee must show that the landlord created the
nuisance by knowingly making a lease for immoral purposes or,
knowing of the disorderly conduct, tolerated it under circumstances that would clearly justify an inference of connivance or
consent to such use. 6 4 But another group holds that where tenants
of other apartments are guilty of prostitution or lewd and disorderly conduct and the landlord having knowledge of the facts
takes no steps to restore order and remove the tenants guilty of
the conduct complained of, his failure to act is a constructive eviction and justifies the injured lessee in vacating the premises and
refusing to pay the remainder of the rent.0 5 No doubt the strict
accountability to which lessors are held in such cases is due partly
to the obnoxious character of the nuisance and the ease with
which the landlord in many jurisdictions may rid himself, by
summary statutory proceedings, of proved violators of the law.
It is quite another matter, in the absence of an express
covenant in the lease, to attempt to impose upon the landlord responsibility for the suppression of the many forms of petty annoyance more or less inevitable under urban living conditions. Short
of the millenium there will always be detestable neighbors and
the landlord cannot be expected to guarantee congenial companionship in the tenement or apartment house. For acts done in the
halls and other parts of the building under his control he is responsible,60 but in the absence of a clause in the lease he has no
general power to regulate the private affairs of his tenants who
are responsible for their own acts should they amount to a nuisance
to others. The principle has been applied in various instances
6 Paterson v. Bridges, I6 Ala. App. 54, 75 So. 260 (1917) ; Congle v. Densmore, 57 Ill. App. 59i (1894); DeWitt v. Pierson, I12 Mass. 8 (1873) ; Katz v.
Duffy, 261 Mass. I49, I58 N. E. 264 (927) ; Gilhooley v. Washington, 4 N. Y.
217 (iSSo) ; Townsend v. Gilsey, i Sweeney I55 (N. Y. 1869) ; Wolf v. Epstein,
71 Ore. I, 140 Pac. 751 (I94).
Milheim v. Baxter, 46 Colo. 155, 1o3 Pac. 376 (I9O9) ; Lay v. Bennett, 4
Colo. App. 252, 35 Pac. 748 (1894) ; Hartenbauer v. Brumbaugh, =o Ill. App. 326
(i92o); Lancashire v. Garford Mfg. Co., i99 Mo. App. 418, 203 S. W. 668
(1918) ; Weiler v. Pancoast, 71 N. J. L. 414, 58 At. 1O84 (i9o4) ; Cushman v.
Thompson, 58 Misc. 539, 109 N. Y. Supp. 757 (i9oS) ; Phyfe v. Dale, 72 Misc.
383, 130 N. Y. Supp. 231 (9I).
0 Stewart v. Forst, i5 Misc. 621, 37 N. Y. Supp. 215 (1896) ; Phyfe v.
Dale, szpra note 65.
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such as the noisy playing of children; 67 a barking dog; s singing
lessons; 9 and other disturbances not of a grave and permanent
nature. 70 The lessee has in any case his remedy directly against
the author of the nuisance. So also, for acts of his landlord not
amounting to a constructive eviction but interfering with the comfortable enjoyment of the premises he may sue at law or bring a
71
bill for equitable relief.
A reading of the cases shows that it is far from easy to
adjust the conflicting interests of those unfortunate creatures
whose desire to live in the heart of a metropolis, whose craving
for sanitary comforts, or whose plain economic necessity compels
them to herd in the expensive cells of the apartment house or the
flimsy compartments of the reconstructed flat. The manner in
which so many thousands live peaceably side by side within these
narrow limits speaks volumes for the good nature and pacific disposition of the average man and woman. But there are always
rude and selfish persons who impose upon their milder neighbors
and, again, there are nervous and sensitive souls incapable of
adjusting their irritable organisms to the common life of the
community. The trend of modern law is against the view that
an owner can collect the rent in complete Olympian aloofness
from the conditions of living on the premises demised; whatever
logical objection there may be to the term "constructive" as applied to eviction the doctrine has accomplished this practical result. Although the cases do not all go so far, there is sufficient
warrant to say that the landlord will be ill advised if he knowingly permits a serious nuisance to exist on the premises, substantially interfering with the beneficial enjoyment, expecting at
the same time to hold the tenant to his part of the contract. Where
noise and disorder are the grounds for complaint, the tenant has
' Seaboard Realty Co. v. Fuller, 33 Misc. io9, 67 N. Y. Supp. 146 (igoo).
'McKinney v. Browning, 126 App. Div. 370, iiO N. Y. Supp. 562 (19o8).
'Chisolm v. Kilbreth, 88 N.Y. Supp. 364(i9o4). But see Sefton v. Juilliard,
supro note 56.
' Tagney v. Taylor, 204 Ill. App. 440 (1917) ; Keenan v. Legardeur, 5 La.
App. 266 (1926) ; O'Neil v. Pearse, 87 N. J. L. 382, 94 At. 312 (1915) ; Ellis v.
McDermott, 147 Atl. 236 (N. J. L. 1929).
.- Rowbotham v. Pearce, 5 Houst. 135 (Del. 1876) ; Winchester v. O'Brien,
266 Mass. 33, 164 N. E. 807 (1929).
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usually been successful where he has shown that the lessor actively participated in, or has been clearly remiss in the suppression
of conduct on the premises contrary to good morals and public
order. Further than that courts proceed with great caution. The
landlord is not obliged to act as social censor for his little community; to put one tenant out to please another. He may and in
fact usually does adopt a social code for his building in the form
of rules and regulations made a part of the contract and obligatory
upon each tenant under penalty of cancellation of the lease. It is
sound policy to do so. But, as leases are commonly drawn, the
rules and regulations are enforceable at the option of the lessor
only, and not by the tenants who can complain of an infraction
of the rules and the lessor will then have to decide whether the
matter should be ignored or is serious enough to require extreme
measures to preserve the character and reputation of the building
in the class to which it belongs, or perhaps, merely aspires.
Of course leases can be drawn making it obligatory on the
owner to enforce the rules and giving the tenant the option to
terminate the lease on failure of the lessor to perform this part
of his contract. They are occasionally so drawn and, as competition for the better class of tenants increases, such covenants may
be introduced with greater frequency by enterprising real estate
agents as convincing evidence of the high standards of conduct
maintained on the property in their charge. If so the rules will
have to be drawn with great skill to maintain reasonable standards
without inviting the meddlesome domination of the crank. But
conveyancers are notoriously timid and he would be a bold stationer that dared introduce such a clause in a common form.
When the public becomes more conversant with the hygienic importance attached by modern medicine to rest and quiet, stronger
ground may be expected to be taken in enforcing the refinements
and amenities of civilized living upon those whose boisterous
spirits and crude manners have hitherto been indulgently regarded
as symbols of the national vitality. Nevertheless our mechanical
contrivances continue to develop on the side of noisy disturbance.
The most trying form of nuisance to the present day apartment
house dweller is the discordant and incessant din of many radios.
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But such is the power of these raucous instruments in dispensing
unsolicited information and mediocre music that laws or ordinances will ultimately be required for the regulation of their
use. The many and varied forms taken today by rented buildings
subdivided into dwellings and offices and the wide difference in
the social habits of their inmates makes it unwise to be too specific
in laying down rules of law for their control. What will be
reasonable and fair in one instance will be harsh and impractical
under other circumstances. But the management of rented property is today a vast business that cannot be conducted on feudal
principles, and this the parties themselves in their mutual relations
usually take into account, establishing conventions for which the
law will in the course of time supply plausible theories.

